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Abstract
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack can flood
a victim site with malicious traffic, causing service dis-
ruption or even complete failure. Public-access sites like
amazon or ebay are particularly vulnerable to such at-
tacks, because they have no way of a priori blocking unau-
thorized traffic.
We present Active Internet Traffic Filtering (AITF), a
mechanism that protects public-access sites from highly
distributed attacks by causing undesired traffic to be
blocked as close as possible to its sources. We identify
filters as a scarce resource and show that AITF protects
a significant amount of the victim’s bandwidth, while re-
quiring from each participating router a number of filters
that can be accommodated by today’s routers. AITF is
incrementally deployable, because it offers a substantial
benefit even to the first sites that deploy it.
1 Introduction
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are recog-
nized as one of the most dangerous threats to Internet op-
eration. An attacker typically uses self-propagating code
to compromise a large number of vulnerable hosts and
commands them to flood the victim with malicious traf-
fic. Any organization or enterprise that is dependent on
the Internet can be subjected to such an attack, causing its
service to be severely disrupted, if not fail completely.
Current responses to DDoS attacks usually involve
manual “hop-by-hop” filter propagation that stops at ar-
bitrary points in the network: Typically, the operator of
a site under attack identifies the nature of attack traffic
and installs filters in the site’s firewall to block this traffic.
Then she contacts her ISP and has the ISP install compa-
rable filters in its routers in order to protect the tail circuit
to the site. The ISP may contact the next provider up-
stream and so on.
The first two problems with the current approach have
been identified and addressed in the literature:
First, the current approach is manual and, hence, too
slow to keep up with a sophisticated attack. Mahajan et
al. have proposed Pushback, a mechanism that automates
filter propagation: A site under attack sends a request to
its edge-router to block (or rate-control) attack traffic. The
edge-router satisfies the request and may as well identify
the upstream routers that contribute most attack traffic and
propagate similar requests to them [14].
Second, the current approach is ineffective in the face
of source address spoofing. I.e., an attack source can
spoof multiple IP addresses and use them to attack the
victim site. In that case, there is practically no way for
the victim site to distinguish attack traffic from “good”
traffic. Thus, blocking (or rate-controlling) attack traffic
by source IP address leads to sacrificing most good traf-
fic as well. To address this, researchers have proposed
anti-spoofing mechanisms that provide each packet with
a non-spoofable identifier [9, 17]. These identifiers can
be used by the victim site to identify and selectively block
attack traffic.
In this paper, we identify and address a new challenge
in protecting public-access sites against DDoS attacks:
Blocking attack traffic using a number of filters per router
that can be accommodated in today’s routers, i.e., effi-
ciently managing the “filtering capacity” of the Internet
during a DDoS attack.
Each hardware router has only a limited number of fil-
ters that can block traffic without degrading the router’s
performance (wire-speed filters). The limitation comes
from cost and space: Wire-speed filters are typically
stored in TCAM (Ternary Content Addressable Memory),
which they share with the router’s forwarding table. Some
of the largest TCAM chips available today accommodate
256K entries [4] and cost about $200 [1]. A sophisticated
router linecard fits at most 1 TCAM chip [6] i.e., at most
256K filters per network interface.
On the other hand, self-propagating code can compro-
mise 1 million hosts [16] and synchronize them to attack
a certain victim. The victim may use packet marking to
identify 1M attack flows, and automatic filter propagation
to send out 1M filtering requests to block these flows.
However, all these requests must be propagated through
the victim’s edge-router and the Internet core. 1M filters
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is too high a load for any edge-router. Moreover, 1M fil-
ters per potential victim is too high a load for the Internet
core.
Yet, there are enough filtering resources in the Inter-
net to block such large-scale attacks. For example, an
attack coming from 100K different networks involves at
least 100K routers, i.e., about 25 billion filters are avail-
able to help block attack traffic. Clearly, the closer we get
to the attack sources, the larger the amount of filtering re-
sources available per attack source; it is the victim’s edge-
router and the Internet core that are the “filtering bottle-
neck”. Therefore, our solution focuses on causing attack
traffic to be blocked as close as possible to its sources,
while requiring a reasonable number of filters from each
participating (edge or core) router.
In this paper, we present AITF (Active Internet Traffic
Filtering), a mechanism that protects public-access sites
against highly distributed denial-of-service attacks. AITF
requires a bounded amount of resources from each par-
ticipating router, on the order of a few thousand entries
of TCAM memory and a few gigabytes of DRAM mem-
ory – we choose these requirements based on real prod-
ucts [2, 6]. AITF is incrementally deployable, because it
offers substantial benefit even to the first sites that deploy
it.
AITF assumes that there exists some anti-spoofing
mechanism, which limits source address spoofing to a
certain degree. The accuracy of the anti-spoofing mech-
anism affects AITF’s power. However, it does not affect
AITF’s resistance to malicious abuse. I.e., AITF prevents,
with high probability, a malicious node from forging fil-
tering requests that would interrupt other nodes’ commu-
nications; this probability is independent from the under-
lying anti-spoofing mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
our assumptions and section 3 describes the protocol in
detail. Section 4 presents performance estimates and sec-
tion 5 discusses Internet deployment. Section 6 presents
simulation results. Sections 7 and 8 discuss vulnerability
issues and related work, and section 9 concludes.
2 Assumptions
2.1 Limited Source Address Spoofing
We do not assume that source address spoofing is 100%
eliminated; we assume the existence of some anti-
spoofing mechanism, which limits source address spoof-
ing to a certain degree. However, we define a minimal
anti-spoofing requirement, which is necessary for AITF to
operate: Any end-host or router can inspect a packet and
identify, at wire-speed, and with high probability, a bor-
der router that forwarded the packet and is located close
to its source.
Clearly, the current Internet architecture does not meet
our minimal requirement. However, a lot of research ef-
fort has been invested in designing deployable mecha-
nisms that do: Park et al. have proposed Distributed
Packet Filtering (DPF), where each participating router
inspects the traffic that arrives at each interface and drops
all packets with detectably fake IP source addresses [15].
Hamadeh et al. have proposed a packet marking scheme,
where each packet is “stamped” by the first participat-
ing border router that forwards the packet [9]. Yaar et
al. have proposed Path Identifier (Pi), where each partic-
ipating router marks the forwarded packets, so that each
packet obtains a “fingerprint” that reflects the entire path
followed by the packet [17]. Each of these mechanisms
either meets our minimal requirement or can be slightly
modified to do so.
As we will see, this minimal requirement is enough
for AITF to mitigate large DDoS attacks. However,
AITF’s power increases, if the underlying anti-spoofing
mechanism provides (i) higher accuracy in identifying the
sources of attack traffic, and (ii) more complete informa-
tion about the path followed by attack traffic.
2.2 Detection and Identification of Attack
Traffic
We assume that a public-access site can detect when it is
under attack. We also assume that, using an anti-spoofing
mechanism, the site can identify the set of traffic flows
that contribute most to the attack and describe each one
of them with an appropriate flow label. The format of the
flow label depends on the anti-spoofing mechanism. For
example, for DPF, it is simply an {IP destination prefix, IP
source prefix} pair; for Pi, it is an {IP destination prefix,
16-bit path identifier} pair.
If an edge-network that hosts an attack source prevents
its clients from spoofing, the traffic sent by the attack
source can be specified and blocked by the victim as an
individual flow. However, if the attack source is allowed
to spoof multiple addresses, its traffic can only be speci-
fied and blocked by the victim as an aggregate of traffic
forwarded by the same border router. Therefore, an edge-
network that hosts attack sources and allows local spoof-
ing will suffer coarser-grained filtering of its traffic.
3 Protocol Description
3.1 Overview
Upon determining that it is under attack, the victim sends
a filtering request to its gateway. The victim’s gateway
temporarily blocks attack traffic and identifies a border
router located close to the attacker – call it the attacker’s
gateway. The victim’s gateway initiates a “counter-
connection setup” with the attacker’s gateway, i.e., an
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agreement not to transmit certain packets – the same way
a TCP connection setup is an agreement to exchange
packets. If the attacker’s gateway does not respond or
does not respect the agreement, the mechanism escalates
to the second round.
In the second round, the victim’s gateway blocks all
traffic forwarded by the attacker’s gateway to the victim.
It does that (i) either by blocking the traffic locally, or (ii)
by contacting another border router close to the attacker.
Escalation can continue until a router along the attack path
responds and a “counter-connection setup” is completed.
If no router responds, attack traffic is blocked locally by
the victim’s gateway. However, as we will see, AITF both
assists and motivates routers close to the attacker to help
block attack traffic.
Note that our minimal requirement allows only for one
escalation round, because the victim’s gateway can iden-
tify only one border router located close to the attacker.
3.2 AITF Messages and Parameters
An AITF message includes the following fields:
• The flow labels field specifies a set of undesired traf-
fic flows that the sender wants blocked.
• The SYN field and the ACK field are 1-bit flags.
• The nonce field is a random number.
Borrowing from TCP terminology, we use the terms
“SYN message”, “ACK message” and “SYN/ACK mes-
sage” to refer to an AITF message with just the SYN flag
set, just the ACK flag set, or both flags set, respectively.
There are 2 AITF parameters:
• The temporary filter timeout Ttmp.
• The filtering window T .
3.3 Incremental Algorithm Description
3.3.1 Terminology
A filtering request is a request to block an undesired flow
described by a specific flow label. An AITF message may
include more than one filtering requests. An AITF router
is a router that runs the AITF algorithm.
We define the following terms with respect to an unde-
sired traffic flow:
• The attacker is the source of the undesired flow.
• The victim is the detonation of the undesired flow.
• The attack path consists of the attacker, the set of
AITF routers the undesired flow goes through, and
the victim.
• The attacker’s gateway is the AITF router closest to
the attacker along the attack path.
• The victim’s gateway is the AITF router closest to
the victim along the attack path.
3.3.2 Basic Algorithm
1. The victim sends a filtering request to the victim’s
gateway, specifying an undesired flow F .
2. The victim’s gateway (vGw):
(a) If the victim has exceeded a configured maxi-
mum filtering request rate R, the victim’s gate-
way drops the message. Else:
(b) Installs a temporary filter to block F for Ttmp
time units and updates the victim’s filtering re-
quest rate.
(c) Initiates and completes a 3-way handshake
with the attacker’s gateway.
3. The attacker’s gateway (aGw):
(a) Responds to the 3-way handshake.
(b) Upon completion of the 3-way handshake, in-
stalls a filter to block F for Ttmp time units.
(c) Sends a filtering request to the attacker, speci-
fying F as the undesired flow.
4. The attacker stops F for T ≫ Ttmp time units or
risks being disconnected by its gateway aGw.
The victim’s gateway installs a filter only temporarily,
in order to immediately protect the victim until the at-
tacker’s gateway takes responsibility. Similarly, the at-
tacker’s gateway installs a filter temporarily, in order to
immediately block the undesired flow until the attacker
stops. As we will see, spending a filter for Ttmp time units
in order to block an undesired flow for T ≫ Ttmp units
is a key feature that enables AITF to block large attacks
with a reasonable number of filters per router.
3.3.3 The 3-way Handshake
The handshake involves the following messages:
1. The victim’s gateway sends a SYN message to the
attacker’s gateway.
2. The attacker’s gateway responds with a SYN/ACK
message addressed to the victim.
3. The victim’s gateway intercepts the SYN/ACK and
responds with an ACK.
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The handshake prevents a malicious router M from
causing a filter to be installed at router aGw and block
traffic to V without V ’s cooperation: When aGw receives
an AITF SYN that requests to block traffic to V , aGw
responds with a SYN/ACK that includes a nonce and is
addressed to V . Malicious router M cannot snoop that
SYN/ACK, unless it is located on the path between aGw
and V . M must send an ACK with the correct nonce
value, otherwise its request is rejected. By picking a suf-
ficiently large and properly random value for the nonce, it
can be made arbitrarily difficult for M to guess the nonce.
The 3-way handshake does open the door to certain
abuses. We discuss them in section 7.2.
3.3.4 Shadow Filtering Table
In the basic algorithm, the attacker’s gateway installs a
filter and blocks the undesired flow F for Ttmp time units,
but expects the attacker to stop sending F for T ≫ Ttmp
time units. A smart attacker can play an “on-off” game:
pretend to cooperate, pause F and resume it as soon as
the attacker’s gateway removes its temporary filter.
To address this case, the attacker’s gateway records a
shadow of the temporary filter in DRAM for T time units.
If the attacker’s gateway receives a second filtering re-
quest for F before the shadow filter expires, the attacker’s
gateway installs a temporary filter as before. This time,
however, if the filter catches F traffic, the attacker’s gate-
way disconnects the attacker.
The same technique is applied by the victim’s gateway
to verify that the attacker’s gateway respects their filtering
agreement, i.e., keeps the undesired flow blocked.
Note that an AITF router must “remember” a flow for
as long as the flow must be filtered. That is, AITF does not
reduce the amount of state required for filtering, it simply
“moves” it from TCAM to DRAM. This makes filtering
cheaper, given that DRAM costs about $0.5/MB, while
TCAM costs about $200/MB.
3.3.5 Escalation
In the basic algorithm, an undesired flow is blocked only
when the attacker’s gateway cooperates. It is possible that
the attacker’s gateway either does not respond at all to the
3-way handshake or responds and then fails to keep the
undesired flow blocked.
If the attacker’s gateway does not respond to the 3-way
handshake within a given grace period, the mechanism
escalates to the next round.
If the attacker’s gateway does respond, but fails to block
the undesired flow for T time units:
1. The victim’s gateway re-initiates the 3-way hand-
shake.
2. If the undesired flow still does not stop, the mecha-
nism escalates to the next round.
Step 1 gives a second chance to the attacker’s gateway to
block the undesired flow, in case the attacker is playing
the on-off game described in section 3.3.4.
When the mechanism escalates, the attacker’s gateway
is viewed as an attacker i.e., all traffic forwarded by the at-
tacker’s gateway to the victim is now considered an attack
flow that must be blocked. So, every time the mechanism
escalates, filtering becomes more aggressive. Escalation
involves two potential actions:
1. The victim’s gateway blocks all traffic from the at-
tacker’s gateway to the victim locally. Or:
2. The victim’s gateway initiates a 3-way handshake
with the AITF located closest to the attacker’s gate-
way on the attack path.
If the victim’s gateway has the necessary filtering re-
sources to filter the attacker’s gateway locally, it chooses
action 1. Otherwise, it chooses action 2, which results
in the basic algorithm being replayed, with the attacker’s
gateway taking the role of the attacker. This is illustrated
in figure 1.
V
A R1
V’s gateway
R2
A_net A_ISP
V_net
Figure 1: Escalation Example - In round 1, the victim’s gate-
way asks from router R1 to block all traffic from attacker A to
victim V . In round 2, the victim’s gateway asks from router R2
to block all traffic from router R1 to the victim V .
We repeat that our minimal anti-spoofing requirement
enables only choice 1, because contacting a second border
router close to the attacker requires that the victim (or its
gateway) have more information on the attack path.
3.4 AITF Parameter Values
3.4.1 Temporary Filter Timeout
The goal of the temporary filter on the victim’s gateway is
to block attack traffic until the 3-way handshake is com-
plete. Considering that Internet round-trip times range
from 50 to 200 msec, a safe value for Ttmp is 1 sec.
3.4.2 Filtering Window
A positive aspect of AITF is that the administrator of an
attack source immediately learns that their machine has
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been compromised and is being used to send undesired
traffic – she finds out either by reading the filtering re-
quests sent to the machine or by noticing that the machine
has been disconnected. So, the choice of the filtering win-
dow T involves the following trade-off: A large T of, say,
30 minutes guarantees that, once a filtering request has
been satisfied, the victim will not receive any traffic from
the corresponding attack source for at least 30 minutes.
However, it also guarantees that the attack source will not
send any traffic at all for 30 minutes, even if it gets imme-
diately patched and cleaned by its administrator.
For the rest of the paper, we use example values of
T = 2 or 10 min – although our performance estimates
are always presented as functions of T . We realize that it
is debatable whether 2 or even 10 minutes are enough for
an administrator to read a filtering request and patch their
system. We use these example values only to illustrate our
performance estimates with specific numbers, and leave
the optimal T value as an open question.
4 Performance Estimates
We use the following metrics to evaluate AITF:
• The filtering response time with respect to an unde-
sired flow F is the amount of time that elapses from
the moment the victim sends the first AITF message
with flow label F until F is blocked.
• The lost victim bandwidth is the fraction of the
victim’s bandwidth that gets consumed by undesired
flows. The preserved victim bandwidth is the frac-
tion of the victim’s bandwidth that remains available
to legitimate flows.
• The filtering resources include the number of filters
(the amount of TCAM memory) and the number of
shadow entries (the amount of DRAM memory) re-
quired by the AITF algorithm.
4.1 Victim’s per Flow Perspective: Filtering
Response Time
In the common case, filtering response time for undesired
flow F equals the one-way delay D from the victim to its
gateway, which is typically a few milliseconds.
Spikes can still occur after D, if the attacker or the at-
tacker’s gateway play the on-off game described in sec-
tion 3.3.4. A router that plays this game would neces-
sarily have to be controlled by the attacker. Each such
compromised router along the attack path induces two
spikes, spaced out by Ttmp time units, because each router
is given two chances to have the undesired flow blocked.
The effect of these spikes on the victim is insignificant, as
we demonstrate in our simulation results.
4.2 Victim’s Aggregate Perspective: Pre-
served Victim Bandwidth
One filtering request causes an undesired flow to be
blocked for T time units, where T is the filtering window.
Thus, a victim allowed to send up to R filtering requests
per time unit can have R ·T simultaneous undesired flows
blocked.
It follows that, the lost victim bandwidth is equal to the
bandwidth Batt of all the undesired flows Natt minus the
bandwidth of the R · T undesired flows that get blocked.
The preserved victim bandwidth Bp is equal to the total
victim bandwidth Bv minus the lost victim bandwidth:
Bp ≥
{
Bv −Batt(1 −
R·T
Natt
) ifR · T < Natt
Bv ifR · T ≥ Natt
For example, consider a victim site that connects to the
Internet through a 100 Mbps link, and a 100 Mbps attack
coming from 1M attack sources. Without AITF, this at-
tack would completely consume the victim’s bandwidth.
For R = 1K filtering requests per second and T = 10
minutes, the victim preserves 60 Mbps of its bandwidth.
For R = 2K filtering requests per second and the same T ,
the victim preserves almost 100% of its bandwidth.
A proof for the above formula can be found in the ap-
pendix.
4.3 Router’s Perspective: Filtering Re-
sources
Consider AITF router Gw, which connects edge-network
Net to its ISP provider. Gw needs filters to run both the
attacker’s gateway algorithm – i.e., block undesired traffic
sent by Net hosts – and the victim’s gateway algorithm –
i.e., block undesired traffic sent to Net hosts.
The attacker’s gateway algorithm spends a filter on
each attacker only temporarily. Beyond that, either the
attacker stops or has its port disabled. Thus, Gw needs a
number of filters proportional to the number of connected
hosts.
The victim’s gateway algorithm initially spends one fil-
ter per filtering request for only Ttmp time units. There-
fore, in order to satisfy Rmax filtering requests per time
unit, Gw needs at least Rmax · Ttmp filters. In the best-
case scenario, all of the attacker gateways cooperate, and
Gw does not spend any more filters. In the worst-case
scenario, none of the attacker gateways respond, and Gw
ends up filtering traffic from all of them. The total num-
ber of filters required by the victim’s gateway algorithm
is bounded by these two cases:
Rmax · Ttmp ≤ Nfilters ≤ Nagw
where Rmax is the max rate of satisfiable filtering re-
quests, and Nagw is the number of attacker gateways.
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For example, consider that one of Gw’s clients is re-
ceiving 1M undesired flows forwarded by Nagw = 160K1
attacker gateways. To preserve all its bandwidth, the vic-
tim needs to send R = 2K filtering requests/sec (see sec-
tion 4.2). Thus, if all attacker gateways cooperate, Gw
must use 2K filters to preserve 100% of its client’s band-
width. If nobody cooperates, Gw must use 160K filters to
have the same effect.
Apart from wire-speed filters, the AITF algorithm also
requires DRAM for the shadow filtering table. Each re-
ceived filtering request is stored in DRAM for T time
units. Thus, a router needsRmax ·T DRAM entries, where
Rmax is the maximum rate of filtering requests that can be
satisfied. Note that DRAM is not the limiting factor: Even
if a network were attacked by 10M attack sources at the
same time, a few gigabytes of DRAM would be enough
for the shadow table.
5 Internet Deployment
5.1 AITF Domains
Rather than requiring every Internet router to support
AITF, it is sufficient for the border routers between ad-
ministrative domains to support it. We introduce the
notion of an AITF domain as an administrative domain
whose border routers are AITF routers.
An AITF domain has a filtering contract with each lo-
cal end-host and peering domain. Such a contract spec-
ifies a maximum filtering request rate, i.e., the maxi-
mum rate at which the AITF domain can send/receive
requests to block undesired flows to/from each end-host
and peering domain. An AITF domain enforces the spec-
ified rates and indiscriminately drops messages from an
end-host/domain when that end-host/domain exceeds the
agreed rate.
In a way, an AITF domain is the “dual” of a BGP Au-
tonomous System (AS): ASs exchange routing informa-
tion, which communicates their willingness to relay cer-
tain packets. Similarly, AITF domains exchange filtering
information, which communicates their unwillingness to
receive certain packets. However, an AITF domain dif-
fers from an AS, in that it exchanges messages with other
AITF domains that are not adjacent to it – recall that the
victim’s gateway talks directly to the attacker’s gateway.
It seems natural for every Autonomous System (i.e., ev-
ery ISP, national network and international backbone), to
map to a separate AITF domain.
Our position is that the filtering contract should be part
of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) signed between
the customer and the service provider. In this way, when
a domain agrees to provide a certain amount of bandwidth
1
160K is the total number of network prefixes currently advertised
in the Internet [7], so this is an upper bound for the number of attacker
gateways.
to a customer, the provider also agrees to satisfy a certain
rate of filtering requests coming from that customer. At
the same time, the customer agrees to satisfy a certain
rate of filtering requests coming from the provider. The
customer-provider pair can be an end-host and an edge-
network, or an edge-network and an ISP, or even a small
ISP and a backbone network.
5.2 Initial Deployment
AITF effectiveness increases with the number of admin-
istrative domains that deploy it. For example, in section
4.3 we saw that the victim’s gateway can block 1M attack
flows using only 2K filters, provided that all the attacker
gateways cooperate. However, in order for AITF to be-
come widely deployed in the first place, it has to offer a
substantial benefit even to the first domains that deploy it.
In this section, we illustrate that this is the case using an
example.
ebay.com
Stanford
R
R
R 160K
1
2
R i
Figure 2: Initial Deployment - only the ebay.com site and Stan-
ford University have deployed AITF.
In figure 2, only two networks in the entire In-
ternet have deployed AITF: Popular website ebay.com
and Stanford University. A worm compromises 1M
hosts, distributed among 160K edge-networks, and com-
mands them to launch a DDoS attack against ebay.com
(66.135.192.87). 160K is the total number of prefixes
currently advertised in the Internet, and, thus, an upper
bound for the number of edge-networks hosting attack
sources [7]. Therefore, an attack coming from 160K
edge-networks is an attack coming from the entire Inter-
net.
The victim’s gateway identifies the 160K edge-routers
that forward attack traffic and requests that they block
their misbehaving clients. Only Stanford’s edge-router
R1 cooperates; R2 to R160K keep forwarding attack traf-
fic. As a result, the mechanism escalates and the victim’s
gateway uses 159, 999 filters to locally block all traffic
coming from all edge-networks but Stanford.
When the AITF mechanism completes, the only edge-
network that has preserved its connectivity to ebay.com
is Stanford, and attack traffic has been eliminated. Of
course, by blocking entire edge-networks, ebay.com also
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blocks the good traffic coming from them. However, the
alternative is to let attack traffic through, which would re-
sult in most good traffic being dropped because of con-
gestion. So, ebay.com benefits from AITF, because it pre-
serves a fraction of its good traffic – even if it is just the
good traffic coming from Stanford. On the other hand,
Stanford clearly benefits from AITF, because it is the only
edge-network to preserve its connectivity to the popular
website during the attack.
To summarize, there may be millions of attack sources,
but there are only thousands of edge-networks to host
them. A router cannot accommodate millions of filters,
but it does accommodate thousands. So, the gateway of a
DDoS victim may be unable to block each attack source
individually, but it is able to block each edge-network in-
dividually. However, blocking an entire edge-network re-
sults in blocking both attack and good traffic coming from
it. To avoid this, the edge-network can take responsibil-
ity, block its misbehaving clients itself, and preserve its
connectivity to the victim.
5.3 Deployment beyond the Edges
We have illustrated that a minimal AITF deployment at
the edges of the Internet enables the gateway of a DDoS
victim to block attack traffic within a single escalation
round. In this section, we discuss large-scale attacks that
require wider deployment.
Net
R
R
100K
1
2
R
i
B 1
B j
R
B
100
Figure 3: Wider Deployment - AITF deployed by all border
routers in the picture.
In figure 3, AITF has been deployed throughout the
Internet. A worm compromises 1M hosts, distributed
among 100K edge-networks, and commands them to
launch DDoS attacks against 100 Net clients. At the
same time, the worm compromises the attacker gateways,
so that they do not respond to AITF messages.
The victim gateway contacts edge routers R1 to R100K
and requests from each one to block its misbehaving
clients. None of them responds, prompting an escalation.
In the second round, the victim gateway contacts border
routers B1 to B100 and requests each one to block all traf-
fic from its attacker gateways to the victims. Each border
router agrees to cooperate and sends appropriate filtering
requests to its attacker gateways. The attacker gateways
either stop forwarding traffic to the victims or get discon-
nected.
In this scenario, it is impossible for Net’s gateway to
locally block all traffic from each attacker gateway to
each victim – it would need 100 · 100, 000 = 10M fil-
ters. Therefore, Net’s gateway requests help from border
routers located close to the attack sources. This requires
(i) that these border routers have deployed AITF, and (ii)
that Net’s gateway can inspect a packet and identify, with
high probability, and at wire-speed, the border routers that
forwarded the packet – which is more than our minimal
requirement.
To summarize, our minimal anti-spoofing requirement
and a minimal AITF deployment at the edges of the In-
ternet enable a network gateway to block a large-scale at-
tack against a few victims. However, to block multiple
large-scale attacks that potentially involve compromised
routers, a network gateway needs (i) wider deployment
range that includes more than one border router along the
attack path, and (ii) more information on the attack path,
i.e., the sequence of border routers that compose it.
The next generation Internet architecture presented in
[12], provides such complete path information. Also, the
Pi mechanism provides each packet with an identifier that
depends on the entire path followed by the packet [17].
Therefore, we believe that it could be adequately modified
to provide the required path information. Finally, even
if there is no existing solution that provides the required
path information, we believe that AITF illustrates how
useful this information can be in fighting next-generation
DDoS attacks, and can motivate further research in this
direction.
6 Simulation Results
We built our simulator within the Dartmouth Scalable
Simulation Framework (DaSSF) [3]. To create our topol-
ogy, we downloaded Internet routing table data from the
Route Views project site [8]. We processed this data using
Gao’s algorithm for inferring Autonomous System (AS)
relationships [13].
In our simulator, we map each AS and each edge-
network to a separate AITF domain. We derive AS topol-
ogy and peering relationships by applying Gao’s algo-
rithm to the Route Views data. We derive edge-network
topology by roughly creating one edge-network per adver-
tised class A and class B prefix.2 We obtained our routing
table data on February 11, 2004; it yielded 64, 608 AITF
domains.3
2We use a simple heuristic to collapse multiple smaller prefixes into
the same edge-network.
3
16, 825 ASs, 143, 779 network prefixes, and 56, 650 edge-
networks
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Figure 4: Mitigating 10 Gbps attack from 10K attackers (left); mitigating same attack through compromised gateways (right).
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Figure 5: Mitigating 10 Gbps attack from 50K attackers using 10K filters. The picture on the left is a zoom in the first 10 sec.
Each AITF domain is represented by one AITF router.4
AITF routers are interconnected through OC192 (10
Gbps) or OC48 (2.488 Gbps) links. End-hosts are con-
nected to their routers through Fast (100 Mbps) or Thin
(10 Mbps) Ethernet links. Internet round-trip times aver-
age 200 msec. Host-to-router round-trip times average 20
msec.
All our simulation scenarios have the following charac-
teristics:
• There is 1 AITF router acting as the victim’s gateway
to 10 DDoS victims.
• Before the attack, each victim is receiving 50 Mbps
of goodput.
• Each victim takes 1 sec to react to the attack, and
100 msec to detect a recurring flow, already identi-
fied and blocked in the past.5
4This leads to worst-case simulation scenarios, because all AITF
messages sent to a domain are handled by a single router with its limited
filtering resources.
5These times are arbitrarily chosen and do not depend on nor affect
AITF operation.
• Each victim is allowed to send up to 1K filtering re-
quests/sec to its gateway.
• Temporary filter timeout is Ttmp = 1 sec and the
filtering window is T = 2 min.
• Attack bandwidths range from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps
per victim.
• The number of attackers ranges from 1K to 300K per
victim, i.e., 10K to 3M overall.
Scenario 1: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traf-
fic, evenly generated by 1K attackers. The attackers are
evenly distributed behind 1K attacker gateways. All at-
tacker gateways cooperate.
Result: As shown in figure 4 on the left, each victim’s
goodput is restored within 10 msec. The victim’s gateway
uses overall 10K filters for 1 sec.
Graph description: Before the attack, the victim’s good-
put is 50 Mbps; the attack starts at t = 1 sec and drives
the victim’s goodput to 0; the victim reacts at t = 2 sec
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by sending 1K filtering requests to its gateway; the vic-
tim’s gateway responds within 10 msec by blocking the
1K undesired flows.
Scenario 2: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traf-
fic, evenly generated by 1K attackers. The attackers are
evenly distributed behind 1K attacker gateways. All at-
tacker gateways are compromised and are playing the on-
off game described in 3.3.4.
Result: As shown in figure 4 on the right, most of each
victim’s goodput is restored within 10 msec, with the ex-
ception of two 100 msec spikes. Some goodput is lost
because of escalation. The victim’s gateway uses overall
10K filters for 2 min.
Graph description: The victim’s goodput is driven to 0
when the attack starts, and restored at t = 2.01 when the
victim’s gateway blocks the undesired flows. Then, the
on-off game starts: The attacker gateways pause forward-
ing attack traffic at t = 2.3, when the victim’s gateway
completes the 3-way handshakes; they resume forward-
ing attack traffic at t = 3.01, when the victim’s gateway
removes the temporary filters. The victim receives the
second attack wave at t = 3.11, and reacts at t = 3.21,
by sending a second wave of filtering requests. This se-
quence of events is “replayed” once more – recall that
each attacker gateway is given two chances – before the
victim’s gateway determines that the attacker gateways
are compromised and blocks their traffic locally. Note
that the victim’s goodput is not restored 100%, because
some of the good traffic gets lost when the mechanism
escalates.
Scenario 3: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traffic,
evenly generated by 5K attackers. All attacker gateways
cooperate and block attack traffic. The attackers pause
sending undesired traffic when so requested to avoid dis-
connection; they resume as soon as the filtering window
expires. Note that the number of undesired flows per vic-
tim (Natt = 5K) is higher than the maximum per victim
filtering request rate (R = 1K).
Result: As shown in figure 5, each victim’s goodput is re-
stored within 5 sec. The victim’s gateway uses 10K filters
for 5 sec every 2 min.
Graph description: The victim reacts at t = 2 sec by
sending 1K filtering requests/sec to its gateway. The vic-
tim’s goodput is completely restored at t = 7 sec, when
all 5K undesired flows are pushed to their gateways.
Scenario 4: Each victim is sent 100 Mbps of attack traf-
fic, evenly generated by 300K attackers. All attacker gate-
ways cooperate and block attack traffic. The attackers
pause sending undesired traffic when so requested, in or-
der to avoid disconnection; they resume as soon as the
filtering window expires. Note that, for each victim, the
number of undesired flows (Natt = 300K) is higher than
the number of flows that can be blocked within the filter-
ing window (R · T = 120K).
Result: As shown in figure 6, 40% of each victim’s band-
width is restored within 2 min. The victim’s gateway uses
10K filters at all time.
Graph description: The victim reacts at t = 2 sec, by
sending 1K filtering requests/sec to its gateway; the at-
tackers start resuming their undesired flows at T = 2
min, when requests start expiring; from that point on,
for each 1K undesired flows blocked, another 1K are re-
leased; hence, the lost victim bandwidth remains constant.
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Figure 6: Mitigating 1 Gbps attack from 3M attackers using
10K filters.
7 Discussion and Future Work
7.1 Automatic Disconnection is Dangerous
AITF involves a rather Draconian measure against attack
sources: Either they stop sending undesired traffic or they
get disconnected. This can be abused by malicious node
M to disconnect legacy host L that does not understand
AITF messages:
1. M sends out a filtering request to block all traffic
from L to M .
2. The request reaches L’s gateway, which propagates
it to L and installs an appropriate filter to verify that
L obeys.
3. M tricks L into sending it some traffic – e.g., if L is
a web server, M makes an http request to it.
4. L’s gateway catches the traffic from L to M and dis-
connects L.
To avoid this abuse, any administrative domain that de-
ploys AITF must either (i) force its clients to deploy AITF
as well, or (ii) accept the burden of filtering the undesired
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traffic they forward – e.g., in the last example, L’s gate-
way does not disconnect L, but installs a filter that blocks
all traffic from L to M for T time units.
The second option is less aggressive and more incre-
mentally deployable, but it disables use of temporary fil-
ters and the shadow filtering table in the attacker’s gate-
way algorithm. As a result, it requires more filtering
resources from each participating gateway, namely, as
many filters as undesired flows generated by the gateway’s
clients. As a compromise, a service provider could charge
legacy clients that do not support AITF, for the potential
filtering load induced by their inability to block their un-
desired traffic themselves.
7.2 Compromised Routers
The 3-way handshake enables a compromised router
cGw, which is located on the path between routers vGw
and aGw, to interrupt their communication:
1. cGw spoofs the IP address of vGw and uses it to
send to aGw a SYN packet with a filtering request
to block all its traffic to vGw.
2. aGw responds with a SYN/ACK.
3. cGw intercepts the SYN/ACK and completes the
handshake.
4. aGw blocks all its traffic to vGw.
On the other hand, a compromised router on the path
between two victim nodes can disrupt the victims’ com-
munication anyway, with or without AITF, e.g. by drop-
ping all their traffic. Of course, AITF does offer a com-
promised router yet another way to damage transit traffic.
Nevertheless, the 3-way handshake is necessary for scala-
bility, because it enables edge-routers to directly establish
filtering agreements, bypassing the Internet core.
7.3 Forged Requests
As described so far, AITF can be abused by malicious
node M to interrupt the communications of node N that
is located on the same subnet with M , i.e., to harm the
connectivity of its own subnet:
1. M spoofs the IP address of N and sends a filtering
request to block certain traffic addressed to N .
2. M ’s gateway cannot verify that the filtering re-
quest is spoofed and completes the appropriate 3-
way handshakes.
3. N looses part (or all) of its communications.
To avoid this abuse, any administrative domain that de-
ploys AITF must either (i) prevent source address spoof-
ing in its own network or (ii) authenticate victim filtering
requests – i.e., requests coming from its own clients.
7.4 DDoS against AITF
The only part of the AITF mechanism that is suscepti-
ble to a DDoS attack is the attacker’s gateway algorithm,
because it is the only one to accept requests from un-
known sources. A router running the victim’s gateway
algorithm only accepts rate-limited requests from its own
customers. Similarly, an end-host/router suspected of be-
ing an attacker, only accepts rate-limited requests from its
own providers – a correctly functioning provider would
not overload a customer with filtering requests and then
disconnect the customer for failing to satisfy them.
The attacker’s gateway algorithm is susceptible to the
following attack: If AITF routerGw is flooded with AITF
messages sent by alleged victim gateways, it spends all
its resources trying to process them and fails to satisfy the
“real” ones. Note that, in order for this to be a problem,
there must be “real” AITF messages, i.e., there must be
Gw clients actually sending undesired flows. Therefore,
in order to launch such an attack on Gw, an attacker must
compromise (i) enough Internet hosts to flood Gw with
bogus filtering requests and (ii) enough Gw clients to ac-
tually start an attack behindGw. Such a powerful attacker
can indeed affect Gw’s ability to execute the attacker’s
gateway algorithm.
Gw can take two steps to mitigate such an attack: (i)
Avoid local buffering of SYN messages corresponding to
uncompleted handshakes. Instead, use the SYN cookie
technique [5] employed by TCP to prevent SYN flood-
ing attacks. (ii) Inspect the received AITF messages and
identify the AITF routers that forward an excess of mes-
sages and filter/rate-limit them (recall that, according to
our minimal anti-spoofing requirement, a node can in-
spect a packet and identify, with high probability, and at
wire-speed, a border router that forwarded the packet and
is located close to its source). Ultimately, if the misbe-
having AITF routers are too many to filter locally, Gw
can act as a DDoS victim and use itself AITF to push fil-
tering of undesired traffic close to its sources. However,
we have not yet studied nor simulated any scenario where
an AITF router acts as a victim.
7.5 Dynamic Allocation of Filtering Re-
sources
An AITF provider does not have to statically preallocate
a fixed number of filters to every client. When there
are enough filters, there is no reason to deny satisfying
a filtering request, even when the corresponding client
has exceeded its maximum rate. In the same way, when
the provider is running out of filters, it can dynamically
communicate to the clients to lower their filtering request
rates.
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8 Related Work
Having briefly introduced the Pushback mechanism in
section 1, we now make a more detailed comparison to
AITF.
Pushback assumes no anti-spoofing mechanism and,
thus, defines an attack flow only in terms of its IP desti-
nation prefix. For example, if end-host V is under attack,
V ’s edge-router identifies the link that contributes most
to the attack and blocks (or rate-limits) all traffic arriving
on that link and addressed to V . As a result, Pushback
(i) is directly deployable in the current Internet, and (ii)
requires from each router only 1 filter per victim. On the
other hand, if attack traffic is uniformly distributed across
the inbound links, a pushback router ends up sacrificing
all (or most) good traffic to the victim – an effect charac-
terized in [14] as collateral damage. As a result, Push-
back is not effective when the attack sources are evenly
distributed across the Internet.
Pushback propagates filtering requests hop-by-hop
through the network. As a result, Pushback does not need
to verify the authenticity of filtering requests. On the
other hand, hop-by-hop propagation of filtering requests
places a large load on the core of the Internet, turning it
into a potential “filtering bottleneck”. The current Push-
back design avoids this problem by filtering based on the
IP destination prefix – which requires only 1 filter per
victim. However, this limits Pushback’s ability to selec-
tively block attack traffic and eliminate collateral dam-
age, even in presence of an anti-spoofing mechanism. We
believe that source address spoofing is a serious enough
problem to motivate the deployment of an Internet-wide
anti-spoofing mechanism. AITF was designed to leverage
such a mechanism to avoid collateral damage and block
large numbers of concurrent attack flows as close as pos-
sible to their sources.
Another mechanism for mitigating DDoS attacks is the
Stateless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) [11]. In this scheme,
all Internet traffic is divided into two categories: Priv-
ileged and non-privileged. Privileged traffic always re-
ceives priority over non-privileged traffic. A client estab-
lishes a privileged channel to a server through a capability
exchange handshake that involves packet marking by all
the routers on the path; the client includes the capability
in each packet it sends to the server; each router along
the path verifies the capability and gives priority to the
client’s traffic. The main advantages of SIFF are that (i)
it does not require any filtering state in the routers, and
(ii) it does not assume any cooperation between ISPs. On
the other hand, it requires deployment in all the routers
on the client-to-server path that control bottleneck links.
Also, once a server is under attack, a new client must try
multiple times (the exact number depends on the strength
of the attack) to establish a privileged channel, because
channel establishment unavoidably involves an exchange
of two non-privileged packets. Finally, it is possible for
malicious nodes to establish privileged connections be-
tween them and flood the network with privileged traffic
– though it should be noted that this attack requires coop-
erating attacker pairs.
Lakshminarayanan et al. have proposed using the In-
ternet Indirection Infrastructure (I3) to enable a victim to
stop certain types of traffic by removing the correspond-
ing I3 identifier from the network [10]. This mechanism
can be used to block traffic addressed to unutilized ports,
contain the traffic of individual applications, or prioritize
the traffic of already established connections. It does not
address the issue of blocking a large number of undesired
flows using a reasonable number of filters per router.
9 Conclusions
We presented AITF, a mechanism that protects public-
access sites against highly distributed denial-of-service
attacks. Its main advantages are that (i) it blocks large
numbers of attack flows, while requiring from each par-
ticipating router only a reasonable number of filters, and
(ii) it is incrementally deployable.
More specifically, if AITF is widely deployed, an AITF
router with 10K filters can mitigate an attack coming from
3M sources uniformly distributed across the Internet, by
restoring 40% of the victim’s bandwidth within 2 min-
utes. If none of the edge-networks hosting attack sources
has deployed AITF, the victim’s gateway still achieves the
same result, but needs up to 160K filters (as many as all
the Internet edge-networks). If an attack source is located
in an edge-network that has not deployed AITF, block-
ing its traffic comes at the cost of blocking all traffic from
the specific edge-network to the victim. Only the edge-
networks that have deployed AITF preserve their connec-
tivity to the victim.
The simple idea behind AITF is that the Internet does
have enough filtering capacity to block large amounts of
undesired traffic – it is just that this capacity is concen-
trated close to the undesired traffic sources. AITF enables
service providers to “gain access” to this filtering capacity
and couple it with a reasonable amount of their own filter-
ing resources, in order to protect their customers in the
face of increasingly distributed denial-of-service attacks.
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A Appendix
• Suppose the victim sends filtering requests for X un-
desired flows F i, i = 1..X . Filtering response time for
F i is T ifr .
• The bandwidth consumed by F i is
Bil = B
i
att ·
T ifr
T+T i
fr
≈ Biatt ·
T ifr
T
.
• Aggregate bandwidth consumed by the X undesired
flows is Bxl ≤ Bxatt ·
Tfr
T
, where Bxatt is the original ag-
gregate bandwidth of the X flows and Tfr = maxT ifr .
• Suppose the victim is receiving Natt undesired
flows, but sends filtering requests only for X of them.
• Aggregate bandwidth consumed by the Natt flows is
Bl = Batt −B
x
att +B
x
l
= Batt −B
x
att(1 −
Tfr
T
) ≈ Batt −B
x
att
≤ Batt (1−
X
Nflows
).
• The victim is allowed R filtering requests per time
unit. Thus, it can keep a total of RT undesired flows
blocked.
• Substituting X for RT , lost victim bandwidth is
Bl ≤ Batt (1−
RT
Natt
).
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